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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Adequacy of Service of Process:

Is service of process

by publication adequate where the party seeking service of
process knows the correct address of the opposing party but no
copy of the summons or complaint are mailed to that address?
Standard of Appellate Review; This issue is a matter of
law, and the Court of Appeals should review for correctness
the legal conclusions of the District Court.1
Preservation of Issue in District Court: This issue was
presented to the District Court in Appellant's Memorandum
and Reply Memorandum in support of Appellant's Motion to
Set Aside Judgment and Decree Quieting Title.
2.

Setting Aside Default Judgment; Should a default

judgment be set aside where (a) the defendant did not receive
actual notice of the action until after the default judgment was
enteredf (b) service of process was given by publication and by
mailing to an inadequate address, and (c) although the attorney
seeking to serve process knew of the defendant's correct address,
no notice was mailed there?

1

Graham v. Sawava. 632 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981.)
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Standard of Appellate Review: The District Court's
decision on this issue should not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.2
Preservation of Issue in District Court; This issue was
presented to the District Court in Appellant's Memorandum
and Reply Memorandum in support of Appellant's Motion to
Set Aside Judgment and Decree Quieting Title.
APPLICABLE RULES
The following rules are relevant in deciding this case: Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1), 4(g), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(3),
60(b)(4), 60 (b)(5) and 60(b)(7)3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case and Disposition in District Court
This action was brought by Respondents ("Plaintiffs" or
"Wardles") to quiet title to certain real property in Davis
County, Utah.

After unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons

and complaint on Appellant ("Defendant" or "Romero") personally,
Plaintiffs sought and obtained an order allowing service by
publication and by mailing to Defendant's last known address.
Plaintiffs misstated Defendant's last known address, however, so
that the summons and complaint were mailed to an inaccurate
address and Defendant did not receive actual notice of the
action.

When Defendant failed to answer the complaint, a default

judgment was entered.

Upon learning of the judgment, Defendant

2

Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989.)

3

The relevant rules are quoted in full in Addendum 1.
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filed a timely motion to set it aside.

This is an appeal from

the District Court's denial of Defendant's

motion to set aside

the default judgment.
Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

On March 1, 1960, Defendant Lester Romero sold a parcel

of real property (the "Property") located in Davis County to the
Plaintiffs.

He received a promissory note for $6,000, secured by

a deed of trust on the Property.

He also received a signed

quitclaim deed conveying the Property back to him, which he could
record if Plaintiffs did not pay as promised.
2.

During the next 33 years Plaintiffs were rarely prompt

in paying their obligations as required by the promissory note.
Consequently, Mr. Romero was forced to constantly work with them
to receive the required payment.

He never allowed more than

three (3) years to elapse without collecting a payment.
3. Although Plaintiffs paid the property taxes as required
by the deed of trust and made occasional payments to Mr. Romero,
the promissory note remained constantly delinquent.

For the past

several years, Plaintiffs have disputed the amount due on the
promissory note.
4.

On May 24, 1993, Mr. Romero, being unable to convince

Plaintiffs of their remaining obligation, recorded the quitclaim
deed.
5.

On or about November 18, 1993, Plaintiffs' attorney,

-6-

George

K. Fadel, mailed a letter to Mr. Romero.4

The letter

was addressed to Mr. Romero at two locations: his residence at
6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT

84084, and a "General

Delivery" address which is the address for the United States Post
Office in Salt Lake City.

The letter requested that Mr. Romero

deed the Property back to Plaintiffs.

Mr. Romero received the

copy addressed to his residence and responded in writing,
suggesting that Mr. Fadel speak with his clients to get all the
facts so they could settle the matter.

Mr. Romero heard nothing

further from either the Plaintiffs or their attorney until after
the default judgment had been entered in this case.
6.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action in

January, 1994. Mr. Fadel attempted to obtain personal service on
Mr. Romero at

his residence at 6270 South Margray Drive. A

sheriff's deputy made numerous attempts between January 13, 1994
and March 11, 1994, but he was not successful in obtaining
personal service.
7.

On June 14, 1994, Mr. Fadel prepared and filed with the

District Court a Motion and Order allowing Service of Process by
Publication.

The Order required service to be made by

publication of summons and "by mailing to the defendant a copy of
Summons and Complaint at his last known address: 1760 West 2100
South. Salt Lake City. Utah 84111" (emphasis added.)

This

address was not Mr. Romero's last known address, nor was it the

4

A full copy of the letter is attached to the Affidavit of
Lester Romero contained in Addendum 2.
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address where the deputy had attempted personal service.
Instead, it is the address of the main United States Post Office
for Salt Lake City.

The District Court signed and entered the

order which Mr. Fadel had prepared.
8.

Acting pursuant to the Order, Mr. Fadel caused a summons

to be published, and attempted twice to mail copies of the
summons and complaint to Mr. Romero at 1760 West 2100 South.
Both mailings were returned to Mr. Fadel unclaimed.
9.

Based on Mr. Romero's failure to appear, a default

judgment was entered on June 16, 1994.
10.

In July 1994, Mr. Romero made a trip to the Davis

County Courthouse to determine what, if anything he needed to do
further since filing his quitclaim deed.

To his surprise, he

discovered the default judgment quieting title to the Property in
the Plaintiffs.

On September 7, 1994, less than 3 months after

the entry of the default judgment, Mr. Romero filed a Motion to
set aside the judgment and decree quieting title in the
Plaintiffs, claiming that he had not been properly served
according to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) 4(e) and citing
URCP 60(b) as grounds for setting aside the default judgment.
11.

Without a hearing, the District Court judge denied

Defendants Motion, ruling that the attempted personal service by
the sheriff and the publication in the Davis County Clipper for
three (3) weeks was reasonably calculated to apprise the
defendant of the action as required by URCP 4(e) and 4(g).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS NOT ADEQUATE.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306

(1950) requires that any means other than personal service used
to effect service of process must not be substantially less
likely to give actual notice than other feasible substitutes.
Where a defendant's actual address is known, it is incumbent on
the plaintiff to give notice at that address.
In Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who relies on alternate means
of service of process must meet two diligence requirements.
First, the plaintiff must show diligence in determining that
personal service cannot be obtained and service by alternate
means is appropriate.

Second, the plaintiff must use diligence

in using the alternate means of service in order to give actual
notice to the defendant.
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of
Mullane, because Plaintiffs mailed the summons and complaint in
this action to an address where Defendant was unlikely to receive
it, instead of mailing to Defendant's correct address which was
known to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the

requirements of Carlson by failing to exercise diligence in
implementing the alternate means of service allowed by the
District Court.
The Utah cases of Guenther v. Guenther, 749 P.2d 628 (Utah
1988); Heath v. Mower. 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979); and Weber v.
-9-

Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316 (Utah App. 1990) all involve facts
similar to the present case.

In each of these cases, the court

required greater diligence in effecting service of process than
was exercised by Plaintiffs in this case.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION UNDER RULE 60(b).
Assuming, arguendo. that service of process was adequate,

the District Court should nevertheless have set aside the default
judgment under URCP 60(b).

Defendant is entitled to relief (a)

under subpart (1) of the Rule, due to surprise; (b) under subpart
(3), due to the fact that Plaintiffs misrepresented Defendants
address to the District Court; (c) under subpart (4), since
process was not personally served in this case; and (d) under
subpart (7), because in spite of Defendant's diligence, default
judgment was entered through circumstances beyond Defendant's
control.
In Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930), the Utah
Supreme Court held that where a defendant (1) has not been served
personally, (2) has no actual notice of pendency of the action in
time to present his defense, (3) is injuriously affected by the
judgment, and (4) has tendered an issue on the merits, he has an
absolute right to have the judgment set aside.

Defendant meets

all of these criteria.
Defendant's Motion to set aside this default judgment was
filed within three months after the entry of the judgment and was
therefore timely.
-10-

Defendant has a meritorious defense which he should be
permitted to present in court.

If Defendant establishes the

allegations contained in his affidavit, Defendant will be
entitled to a ruling that there are still sums owed to him and
that he has a valid lien against the Property securing those
sums.
In the alternative, this case should be remanded to the
District Court with instructions to consider Defendant's grounds
for relief under URCP 60(b).

While the District Court addressed

sufficiency of service of process, it failed to recognize that
even if Defendant was legally served with process, URCP 60(b) may
require setting aside the default judgment and addressing this
case on its merits.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY RULED THAT SERVICE OF PROCESS
WAS SUFFICIENT UNDER URCP 4(e) AND 4(g).
Rule 4(e)(1) of the URCP states that personal service on an

individual must be made by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the individual personally or by leaving it at the
individual's residence with someone of suitable age and
discretion.

Mr. Romero lives alone. Personal service was

attempted unsuccessfully at his residence at 6270 Margray Drive,
West Jordan, UT

84084.

When Plaintiffs were unable to obtain

personal service on Defendant, they resorted to alternative
service pursuant to Rule 4(g) of the URCP.
-11-

If a party to be served cannot be identified, located or
served, Rule 4(g) of the URCP allows service of process "by
publication, by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means,
or by some combination of the above, provided that the means of
notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency
of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable.
The constitutional requirements relating to service of
process were explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), as follows:
[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is
a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of
any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it
is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected... or, where conditions do not reasonably
permit such notice, that the form chosen is not
substantially less likely to bring home notice than
other of the feasible and customary substitutes. 339
U.S. at 315. (Citations omitted.)
Mullane involved notice of a final accounting and
termination of a trust.

A New York statute allowed the trustee

of the trust to notify all beneficiaries by simply publishing
notice in a local newspaper.

The Supreme Court used a balancing

approach to analyze the validity of the New York statute,
balancing the rights of the trust beneficiaries against the
interests of the state in effecting a final settlement of the
trust.

The court reasoned that it would not be practicable to

require personal notice to every beneficiary (some of whom may
not be locatable), nor would it be equitable to allow notice by
-12-

publication only to beneficiaries who could easily be located and
who could be informed by surer means.

The court concluded that

different forms of notice would be permissible for different
classes of beneficiaries.

Referring particularly to

beneficiaries with known addresses, the court stated:
As to known present beneficiaries of known place
of residence, however, notice by publication stands on
a different footing.... Where the names and post
office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are
at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.
The trustee has on its books the names and
addresses of the income beneficiaries represented by
appellant, and we find no tenable ground for dispensing
with a serious effort to inform them personally of the
accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the record
addresses. 339 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added.)
In Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court applied the Mullane principles and established
important Utah guidelines governing alternative means of service
of process.

Carlson involved service of process on a non-

resident motorist.

The plaintiff had given notice by mail to a

two and one-half year old address.

No effort was made to

determine the defendant's current address.
the competing interests of the parties.

The court considered

First and foremost among

those was the defendant's right to be informed of pending legal
action and to be provided with an opportunity to defend.
1271.

Id. at

This was balanced against the practical obstacles facing

the notice giver such as cost and time involved.

.Id. at 1273.

In Carlson the plaintiff only needed to locate one person.
The court conceded that some money and time may be lost in
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identifiable as the main post office for Salt Lake City.

In

doing so, they selected a method of notice which was much less
likely to apprise defendant of this lawsuit than other means
which were readily available.
The District Court considered the mailing, publication, and
personal service attempts together, and concluded that the
plaintiffs had made a diligent effort.

But this analysis ignores

the fact that Carlson requires two diligent efforts. After using
diligence to show that alternative service is appropriate, a
plaintiff must then use diligence in implementing the alternative
service so that the notice is reasonably calculated to reach the
defendant.
This default judgment must be set aside based on similar
facts in other cases.

In the case of Guenther v. Guenther, 749

P.2d 628 (Utah 1988), the sheriff tried to personally serve the
defendant but was unsuccessful.

However, the plaintiff knew the

defendant's last known address and mailed a notice to that
address.

The defendant received that notice and service was held

to be adequate.
If, as in Guenther, Plaintiffs had sent the notice to 6270
Margray Dr. which was Mr. Romero's correct last known address,
then he would have received it and a default judgment would not
have been entered.
In Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 1979), plaintiff's
counsel mailed a withdrawal of counsel notice to defendant's last
known address, to defendant's wife's last known address, and upon
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If, as Defendant maintains, there was inadequate service of
process, the default judgment entered by the District Court is
void.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S URCP MOTIONS FOR RELIEF.
A District Court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a
motion for relief from judgment under URCP 60(b)and its
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.

Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App.

1989); Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).

However, the

District Court "should be generally indulgent toward permitting
full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled
advisedly and in conformity with law and justice."

Mavhew v.

Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 1962).

"Courts

generally tend to favor granting relief from default judgments
where there is any reasonable excuse . . . ." Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah
1975).

In fact, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of

discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendants failure to
appear and timely made application is made to set it aside."
Mayhew, at 952, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986).
Defendant realizes that the burden of showing that the
District Court abused its discretion lies with him.

The Utah

Supreme Court laid out three criteria that a movant must meet to
overcome the abuse of discretion standard and have a default
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to the Davis County Courthouse to determine what, if any further
action he needed to take in regards to the previously recorded
quitclaim deed.

He was surprised to learn of a default judgment

entered against him.
Mr. Romero, by his return letter, had put the onus on
Plaintiffs' attorney to contact him again concerning this matter
and Mr. Romero fully expected that he would be contacted as
evidenced by his letter stating that he desired to settle this
case with the Plaintiffs for what they owed.
From November to July, Mr. Romero was not contacted and
notice was not given to him about the pending matter.

Thus he

was justifiably surprised to discover the default judgment.

It

should, therefore, be set aside according to URCP 60(b)(1)
2.

URCP 60(b)(3)

Defendants second URCP 60(b) action for relief is governed
by URCP 60(b)(3) which states that relief can be granted for
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the adverse party.
Mr. Romero states that Plaintiffs' attorney misrepresented
to the court his last known address.
Mr. Fadel knew that Mr. Romero could be reached at 6270
Margray Dr. He had previously corresponded with Mr. Romero at
that address and had instructed the deputy to serve Mr. Romero at
that address.

Yet he represented to the District Court, in his

motion asking it to grant service by publication and mail, that
Mr. Romero's last known address was General Delivery, 1760 West
2100 South, Salt Lake City, UT

84111.
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When, iruin any cause, the auuuaons in ai. aunuii uc? . .
been personally served on the defendant or his legal
representative, the court may allow, on such terms as
may be just, such defendant or his legal
representative, at any time within ninety days after
the entry of any judgment in such action, to answer to
"...-:- the merits of-the original action

5

Section 1293, Compiled Laws of Ut ah o E 1876, allowed a
defendant who had not been personal! y served a period of six
months after the judgment to have the judgment set asi de and
answer the merits of the complaint.

Naisbitt v. Herrick, 290 P. 950 (Utah 1930) is a case
decided

under section 104-14-4 which is quite similar to the

present case*

Naisbitt was a quiet title action.

was served only by publication.

The defendant

Within a year after the final

decree was entered, the defendant, who had not received actual
notice of the lawsuit until after the decree, moved to have the
judgment set aside.

His motion was denied by the District Court.

The Supreme Court reversed, stating as follows:
In proceedings to open default judgments, the
courts quite generally distinguish between those
judgments where personal service of summons has been
had or personal appearance has been made before
judgment and those judgments where there has been
merely constructive service of process....
The law applicable to... [judgments founded upon
constructive service of process] is stated in 1 Freeman
on Judgments (5th Ed.) p. 451, §229. It is there said,
in referring to statutes allowing judgments based on
constructive service of process to be vacated, that "on
complying with the conditions of the statute, the
moving party acquires an absolute right to have the
judgment opened, which the court has no discretion to
deny." Numerous cases cited in support of the text
will be found collected in a footnote. The rule of law
deducible from the adjudicated cases there cited is
this: If a moving party shows (1) that he has not been
personally served with process, (2) that he had had no
actual notice of the pendency of the action in time to
appear and make his defense, (3) that he is injuriously
affected by the judgment, and (4) that he has tendered
an issue to the merits of the claim of his adversary,
then and in such case he has an absolute right to have
the judgment opened. 290 P. at 953.
Defendant acknowledges that section 104-14-4 has been superseded
by Rule 60(b).

The wording of the Rule is so close to the

wording of the former statute, however, that Naisbitt remains
good precedent.
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default

Defendant has shown a reason justifying relief according to
URCP 60(b)(7) and the default judgment should be set aside.
B.

Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment
must be timely made.

According to Rule 60(b)f a motion is timely under subparts
(b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(4) when it is filed within three (3)
months of receiving notice of the default judgment.

However, the

time period for 60 (b)(7) is a reasonable time after receiving
notice.

Defendant has clearly filed both within the three month

period and within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the
default judgment.
1994.

The default judgment was entered on June 16,

Mr. Romero learned of it on July 20, 1994. On September

7, 1994, Mr. Romero filed his motion to set aside the default
judgment.
C.

Defendant has a meritorious defense.

The Utah Supreme Court, in State By & Through Dept. of Soc.
Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), defined what it
meant by a meritorious defense.

The Court stated that it was

"one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts
which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgement different
from the one entered."

.Id. at 1057.

In Mr. Romero,s memorandum in support of the motion to set
aside the default judgment, he refers to the accompanying
affidavit which states specific and sufficiently detailed facts
that would result in a different judgment if they are proven.
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shows

but failed to recognize that even if service of process is
legally sufficient there may be equitable grounds to set aside
the default judgment and address the case on its merits.

Rule

60(b) is intended to be used "in the furtherance of justice" to
relieve a party from a final judgment in the circumstances
described in the Rule.

There is no discussion in the District

Court's ruling of whether or not this case meets the criteria for
relief under Rule 60(b).

In fact, there is no mention whatever

of Rule 60(b) in the court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Through no fault of his own Mr. Romero never received
service of process.

Service was not adequate under URCP 4(g) nor

under Mullane and Carlson.

The District Court abused its

discretion when it found service to be "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise the defendant of the
pendency of the action."

Even if the service was adequate, it

was not personal service and Mr. Romero should be relieved from
the effects of the default judgment under Rule 60(b).

For these

reasons Defendant requests this court to set aside the default
judgment.
DATED this ^ 0

day of March, 1995.
LUNDBERG & MEADERS
By
Scott :
Attorneys
Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

Zo

day of March, 1995, I caused two

copies of the foregoing pleading to be mailed, postage prepaid,
to the following:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
<^4~c^C
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ADDENDUM 1: RULES

Rule 60(b)
Mistakes; inadvertence: excusable neglect: newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action
has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action;
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgement has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and
for reasons (1) , (2), (3), or (4 ), not more than 3 months after the
judgment order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.

4(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows:
1.
Upon any individual other than one covered by
subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) belowf by delivering a copy of the
summons and/or the complaint to the individual personally, or by
leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there
residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.

4(g)

Other service.

Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served
are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable diligence,
where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable
under the circumstances, or where there exists good cause or
believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of
process, the party seeking service of process may file a motion
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by
publication, by mail, or by some other means. The supporting
affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or
serve the party to be served, or the circumstances which make it
impracticable to serve all of the individual parties.
If the
motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by
publication by mail from the clerk of the court, by other means, or
by some combination of the above, provided that the means of notice
employed
shall be
reasonably
calculated
under
all the
circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of
the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable. The
court's order shall also specify the content of the process to be
served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the
defendant with the process specified by the court.

ADDENDUM 2:

PLEADINGS

GEORGE

#1027
K. F A i j ^ i n t i f f s

ATTORNEY FOR
1TO WE8T FOIRTH SOl'TH
BouNTiri'L, U T A H 8 4 0 1 0
TELEPHONE 2 0 5 - 2 4 2 1

LB «

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

GLEN D. WARDLE and
THORA WARDLE,
|
MOTION FOR SERVICE
OF PROCESS BY PUBLICATION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.

|

Civil No. 940700002

LESTER ROMERO,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Defendant.
On January 3, 1994, George K. Fadel, attorney for
plaintiffs, deposited a Summons and Complaint with the Civil
Process Division of the Salt Lake County S h e r i f f s Office to be
served upon Lester Romero, defendant.

Having expended

significant effort, the Salt Lake County Sheriff has been unable
to serve process upon Romero.

Since January 13, 1994, Officer

Jack Hill of the Salt Lake County S h e r i f f s Department has
attempted to serve Romero at his residence twenty-three times.
Officer Hill has had prior dealings with Romero and believes that
Romero recognizes Officer Hill and is intentionally avoiding
service of process.

Officer Hill believes that Romero has been

home but has refused to answer his door.

Additionally, Officer

Hill has sent Officer Ron Jensen to attempt service of process.

1

Officer Jensen's efforts were equally unproductive.
Having exhausted other service of process methods,
plaintiffs pray for an order authorizing service of process upon
defendant, Romero, by publication in the Davis County Clipper, a
newspaper of general circulation in Davis County, Utah.

^eorge K2 Fadel
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Sworn to and subscribed before me this

/A

day of April,

%
tte4ary Public
r^LL.f?SM/-\.ALr<^
'\J\
Residing at Bountifui^XJtah ^• >
'•$,£
i to •. (y>f~ ^ l: o £
*•?•'•
•*!,
±:2

My Conunxssion expires:

v *•
\
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••

lf

W

/^ /
• \<S^
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ORDER
Upon reading the foregoing motion and good cause appearing
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that service of process upon
Lester Romero be made by publication of summons in the Davis
County Clipper, Bountiful, Utah, at least once a week for four
successive weeks, and by mailing to the defendant a copy of
Summons and Complaint at his last known address: 1760 West 2100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
Dated this

\2J^

day of April, 1994.
By the Court:
Distric
2

J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290
Telephone: (801) 363-2262
L&A Case No. X0045
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE IN
PLAINTIFFS

GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA
WARDLE,
Plaintiffs,
V.

Civil No. 940700002

LESTER ROMERO,
Defendant.
Defendant,

Judge Rodney S. Page
through

his

counsel,

submits

the

following

memorandum in support of his Motion to Set Aside Judgment and
Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs (the "Motion").
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Plaintiffs commenced this action in January, 1994 and

issued a summons for service on January 3, 1994.
2.

(Record.)

Defendant claims a security interest in the property

subject of this action (the "Property"). (Affidavit of Lester
Romero (hereinafter the "Affidavit"), Mf 4-11.)
3.

Plaintiffs' counsel made application to the Court for an

order authorizing alternative service by publication. (Record.)

i

4.

In that application, plaintiffs' counsel represented that

23 unsuccessful

attempts

had been made

to

serve

defendant.

(Record.)
5.

From the court's file (specifically language in the order

authorizing alternative service which states that the last known
address of the defendant is 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City,
UT 84111), it appears that plaintiffs' counsel's representations
concerning the attempted service were either false or that those
attempts were made at the U.S. Post Office which is located at that
address• (Record.)
6.

Defendant resides at 6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT

84084. (Affidavit, H14).
7.

Plaintiffs' counsel was aware of the defendant's address

at his residence. (Affidavit, HH13-15.)
8.

Defendant had no knowledge of this action until July 21,

1994. (Affidavit, H19.)
9.

Plaintiffs did not make all the payments due on their

obligation to defendant, which obligation was secured by a deed of
trust on the Property. (Affidavit, HH6-8, 10, 15.)
10.
Plaintiffs

The Court entered a Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in
(the

" Judgment")

on

June

15,

1994,

based

defendant's failure to respond to the plaintiffs' complaint.
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upon

ARGUMENT
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for relief
from

judgment

in

certain

situations,

including

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect"

"mistake,

(Rule 60(b)(1),

"fraud • . . misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party" (Rule 60(b)(3), "when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e)" (Rule 60(b)(4), or "any other reason
justifying

relief

from the operation of the judgment" (Rule

60(b)(7).

A motion for relief under Rule 60(b) must be timely

made, no more than three months after entry in the case of Rule
60(b)(1), (3) and (4).
This motion is brought within three months following the entry
of the Judgment, and the facts of this case clearly warrant relief
from the Judgment.

Defendant was not personally served with a

summons and complaint and was not aware of this case or the
Judgment until July 21, 1994.

The facts demonstrate that the

Judgment was entered by reason of either mistake or fraud on the
part of plaintiffs' counsel.
From the Court's file, it appears that counsel for the
plaintiffs, either by design or neglect, sent the summons and
complaint for service on the defendant at the address for the U.S.
Post Office on 2100 South.

It is, frankly, inconceivable that a

process server would make 23 attempts to serve the defendant at
-3-

II

that location.

However, that is the conclusion that seems most

likely from the available facts.
I

In fact, plaintiffs' counsel knew that defendant had an
address of 6270 South Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084 because
he sent a letter dated November 18, 1993 to the defendant at that

address and received a reply from the defendant* Whether he failed
to use it intentionally or by negligence, he nonetheless failed to
use it.
been

Had he done so, it is very likely that service would have

promptly

accomplished

and defendant

would

have had an

| opportunity to defend himself against plaintiffs' claims.
I

Where a reasonable excuse is offered by the defaulting party,

I the court should favor granting relief from a default judgment,
A unless to do so would result in substantial injustice to the
adverse party.
[Contractor.

544

Westinahouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
P.2d

876

(Utah

1975).

It

is

usually

not

| appropriate to examine the merits of the claim decided by default
a on a motion under Rule 60(b). Larsen v. Collins. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah

11984).
I

Defendant clearly has a reasonable excuse for failing to

[ respond to the complaint in this case.

He was not even aware of

II

its existence until after the Judgment was entered.

The Court

| needn't examine the merits of plaintiffs' claims at this time.
| Even were it to do so, defendant has set forth facts which would

-4-

clearly require a trial or evidentiary hearing in order for the
Court to render ^ reasoned decision on plaintiffs' claims.
CONCLUSION

The Court should set aside the Judgment and grant defendant
reasonable time to file a responsive pleading to the plaintiffs'
complaint•
DATED this _G_ day of September, 1994.
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES

By

\

/^<PdtJ^Mj*>

9-

:t Lunc^ferg
Lunc^erg
J./Sfcott
Attor^/ys for Defendarf
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

of September, 1994, I caused a

copy of the foregoing Memorandum to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
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J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290
Telephone: (801) 363-2262
L&A Case No. X0045
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA
WARDLE,

AFFIDAVIT OF LESTER ROMERO

Plaintiffs,
V.

Civil No. 940700002

LESTER ROMERO,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.
:

-

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

Lester Romero, having been duly sworn, states and represents
as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah,

over the age

of 21 years.
2.

I am the defendant in this action.

3.

I make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge,

unless noted otherwise, and would so testify in court if called as
a witness in this case.
4.

In 1960, I was the owner of the property subject of this

action (the "Property").

5.

At that time, my former wife's parents, the plaintiffs in

this action, were having a difficult time financially and I agreed
to sell them the Property for $6,000.00.
6.

The purchase price for the Property was paid in the form

of a promissory note in the amount of $6,000.00, secured by a deed
of trust in my favor. In addition, the plaintiffs executed a quit
claim deed on the Property which I held as additional security.
7.

The plaintiffs did not make all the payments required by

the promissory note in a timely fashion and I had to constantly
work with them to get the required payments.
8.

At no time did I allow more than three (3) years to go by

without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs.
9.

The plaintiffs paid the real property taxes on the

Property as required by the deed of trust.
10.

There

have

been disagreements

between

me

and

the

plaintiffs on the amount still due on the promissory note for
several years.
11.

Not being able to convince the plaintiffs to make the

payments still due, I recorded the quit claim deed on May 24, 1993.
12.

Thereafter,

I

received

a

letter

from

plaintiff's

attorney, George Fadel, dated November 18, 1993.

A copy is

attached as Exhibit "A.M
13.

The November 18, 1993 letter was addressed to me at two

(2) addresses: (a) 6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084; and
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a

(b) General Delivery, 1760 West 2100 South, Salt Lake City# UT
84111.
14.

I received the November 18, 1993 letter at my home at

6270 Margray Drive, West Jordan, UT 84084.
15.

In response to Mr. Fadel's letter, I sent a lengthy reply

indicating that the plaintiffs had not paid the promissory note off
and that I recorded the quit claim deed pursuant to the agreement
I had with the plaintiffs that I would do so if they did not pay.
A copy of my letter is attached as Exhibit MB.M
16.

I heard nothing further from Mr. Fadel or the plaintiffs.

17.

On July 20, 1994, I visited the clerk of the Court in

Davis County to determine what additional action, if any, I needed
to take after recording the quit claim deed.
18.

At that time, personnel in the clerk's office indicated

that a case had been filed which involved the Property.

I left a

written request that the clerk's office send me a copy of the
docket sheet.
19.

On July 21, 1994, I received a copy of the docket sheet

in this case and learned, for the first time, of the existence of
this case.
20.

I have reviewed the pleadings

filed by Mr. Fadel,

particularly those filed in support of his motion or application
for an order authorizing service of process by publication.
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21.
South.

I have never lived at the address of 1760 West 2100
In fact, it is common knowledge that that is the address

for the post office.
22.

Mr. Fadel's motion states that 23 attempts were made to

serve the summons and complaint on me, yet he apparently neglected
or failed to file any affidavit or return of service from the
Sheriff's office supporting that contention.
23.

Mr. Fadel fails to state in his motion what address was

used in an attempt to serve me with the summons and complaint. Yet
the order for publication, prepared by him# states that the last
known address for me was the 1760 West 2100 South address, the
address of the post office.
24.

I don't know officer Jack Hill or officer Ron Jensen of

the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office.
25.

I had no knowledge of any attempt to serve me with the

summons and complaint, and I made no effort to evade any such
attempt•
DATED this^fe

day of September, Wi.

Lester Romero

^>j

Subscribed and sworn to before me by Lester Romero this <f_
day of September, 1994.

My Commission Expires
i i

NotarjnPublic
Resid\ing at; _ , ^ ^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on the 7

4K

' %535%4y
I ^0*mf^y^
L J i S ^

nn-.nr.trfr I ""^
fcoo I
Hf cSrnrniMJon Ex^J
October 19 IJK
i
State of l)tah~ j

day of September, 1994, I caused a

I copy of the foregoing Affidavit to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
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GEORGE K. F A D E L
ATTORNEY AT LAW
KOCK-MANOI
170

WEST 400

SOUTH

BOUNTIFUL. UTAH 8 4 0 1 0

November- 18, 1993

Mr. Lester Romero
6270 Margray Drive
West Jordan, Utah 84084
General Delivery
1760 West 2100 South
Salt Lake City# Utah

84111

Dear Mr. Romero:
I have been consulted and retained by Glen D. Wardle and Thora
Wardle concerning the Trust Deed and Quitclaim Deed you recorded
May 24, 1993, against their home at 320 East Center Street, North
Salt Lake, Utah.
If you have any claim to the property at all at this date,
your proper remedy would be to pursue a foreclosure of the Trust
Deed but not to record the Quitclaim Deed.
Presumably the
Quitclaim Deed made on the same date as the Trust Deed, March 1,
1960, was only intended as a mortgage.
You are requested to quitclaim the property back to the
Wardles. If you desire to discuss the possibility of a settlement
of any claim you may have, please call me at 295-2421.
If we have not resolved this matter in the next few weeks, we
shall be required to commence appropriate proceedings to remove the
deed cloud by a quiet title action, and request punitive damages.
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George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiffs
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
295-2421
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
GLEN D. WARDLE and
THORA WARDLE,
}
Plaintiffs,
|

MEMORANDUM OPPOSING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFF

vs.
|

Civil No. 940700002

LESTER ROMERO,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Defendant.
The plaintiff submits this memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion to set aside the judgment.
Attached hereto is a copy of the Quit Claim Deed recorded by
the defendant which shows an address of 1760 West 2100 South,
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111.

Also attached is a copy of the

envelope postmarked December 13f 1993 which contained
correspondence from the defendant with a return address of
"Airport Motel, 6270 S. 2005 W., West Jordan, Utah 84084.
An affidavit will be forthcoming from Jack Hill, Deputy
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah whose return shows 23 attempts
to serve the defendant and the address given at which to serve
was 6270 Margray.

Officer Hill previously advised that he had

known the defendant and that the defendant was deliberately
avoiding service by failing to answer the door.
No payment or acknowledgement of the debt was made after

1980f and the applicable statute of limitations is six years.
The applicable statutory provision for tolling the statute is
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-44:
In any case founded on contract, when
any part of the principal or interest shall
have been paidf or an acknowledgment of an
existing liability, debt or claimf or any
promise to pay the same, shall have been
made, an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such
payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing,
signed by the party to be charged thereby.
When a right of action is barred by the
provisions of any statute, it shall be
unavailable either as a cause of action or
ground of defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44.
Contrary to the affidavit of Romero which implies that
payment of taxes may toll the statute, the Utah Supreme Court in
Upton v. Heiselt Const. Co, 208 P.2d 945 (Utah 1949) held that:
The payment of taxes is an obligation of
property ownership, and is an act necessary
in order to preserve and protect one's
property. It is an equivocal act so far as
recognition of any contract obligation is
concerned, in that it is an act which would
be performed by the property owner without
regard to the existence or non-existence of
an obligation on a note and mortgage. His
payment of taxes does not of itself indicate
that he had in mind that there was an
outstanding contractual obligation requiring
him to make that payment. He could well make
such a payment and have in mind that he was
under no contractual obligation to do so. It
is reasonable to say, then, that the mere
payment of taxes by the property owner is not
os sufficient probative value to indicate the
existence of a contractual obligation to do
so, and, thereforer does not constitute a
payment . . . which will toll the statute of
limitations.
Id. at 948.

The defendant cites Rule 60 (b)(4) as a basis for setting
aside a judgment "when for any causef the summons in an action
has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4 (e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said
action."

Rule 4 (e) relates to personal service.

Rule 4 (g)

relates to other service where personal service cannot be made
and service is made by publication for a judgment in rem and not
a judgment in personam.

The judgment rendered in the above

entitled action was solely in rem.

The Court specifically stated

from the bench that no other relief requiring personal service
would be granted.
The Sheriff• s affidavit is expected to follow.
The defendant motion should be denied.

en
DATED this

/

day of September, 1994.

dfeorge K. Fadel
Attorney for Plaintiffs
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND DECREE QUIETING TITLE
IN PLAINTIFFS to J. Scott Lundberg, P.O. Box 1290, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84110-1290, this y fr day of September, 1994.

J. Scott Lundberg (U.S.B. No. 2020)
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendant
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1290
Telephone: (801) 363-2262
L&A Case No. X0045
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA
WARDLE,

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING MOTION TO SET
ASIDE JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE IN
PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs,
v.
LESTER ROMERO,

Civil No. 940700002

Defendant.

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant, through his counsel, submits the following reply to
the Memorandum Opposing Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Decree
Quieting

Title

in

Plaintiffs

filed

by

the

plaintiffs

(the

"Plaintiff's Memorandum")•
POINT I
The Court Should Not Examine the Merits of
Plaintiffs' Case in Ruling on a Motion under
Rule 60(b).
Plaintiffs attempt to confuse the issue before the Court by
arguing [apparently] that the statute of limitations expired on the
debt to defendant which was secured by both a deed of trust and a
quit claim deed.

They also cite, erroneously, to a case dealing

with the payment of taxes and the question of whether the payment
tolls the statute of limitations.
A

First, plaintiffs7 attempts to argue the merits of their case
an inappropriate here.

As indicated in the Memorandum filed in

support of defendant's motion, the Court need not evaluate the
| merits of the underlying case in deciding a motion to set aside a
I default judgment•
I

Second, even if it were appropriate to argue the merits of the
underlying case, plaintiffs' attempts to do so are unpersuasive.

I Without any basis in fact, plaintiffs' counsel states that Mno
A payment or acknowledgement of the debt was made after 1980.M That
statement is directly contradicted by the Affidavit of Lester
I Romero filed in support of defendant's motion. Mr. Romero, under
loath, stated that "[a]t no time did I allow more than three (3)
| years to go by without receiving a payment from the plaintiffs."
1

Plaintiffs' citation to Upton v. Heiselt Const. Co., 208 P.2d
945 (Utah 1949) is apparently based upon plaintiffs' erroneous

| assumption that defendant argues that plaintiffs' continued payment
U of taxes evidences the existence of the obligation.

In fact, the

| mention in the Affidavit of Lester Romero of payment of taxes was
intended to counter the arguments originally made by plaintiffs in
their complaint and motion for entry of default judgment (and
reflected in the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared
| by plaintiffs' counsel) that their payment of the taxes bolstered

-2-

their claim to ownership of the property (apparently an attempt to
invoke the doctrine of adverse possession). Mr. Romero's reference
to the payment of taxes was intended only to rebut that reliance on
an adverse possession theory.

Adverse possession based upon

payment of taxes is inappropriate in a situation where the occupant
of the property is under contractual obligation to the other party
to pay those taxes.
POINT II
Adequate Cause Exists for the Court to Grant
Relief under Rule 60(b).
Plaintiffs

argue

that

Rule

60(b)(4)

doesn't

support

defendant's motion because the case was in rem and personal service
isn't required.

Even if the Court is persuaded by plaintiffs'

position on that point, plaintiffs failed to address the other
three (3) bases for relief relied upon by the defendant.
Rule 60(b)1) provides for relief from a default judgment in
cases involving "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect."

Rule

60(b)(3) provides

for relief

in

situations

involving "fraud . • • misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party."

Finally, Rule 60(b)(7) provides for relief for

"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."
One or more of those provisions applies to the situation
presented by the facts of this case. As clearly evidenced by the
Affidavit of Lester Romero, defendant was completely surprised by
-3-

the

judgment

entered.

He had no notice whatsoever

of the

proceeding or the judgment until after it had been entered.
Plaintiffs attempt to explain their use of the address for the
General Office of the United States Postal Service by attaching a
copy of a quit claim deed.

Careful examination of the deed

indicates that it was originally prepared in 1960, long before Mr.
Fadel's letter to defendant

(dated November 18, 1993) at the

correct address of 6270 Margray, West Jordan, Utah. The 1760 West
2100 South address clearly was that for Mr. Horace Knowlton# the
attorney for defendant at the time the document was prepared in
I960. Even if that address were supplied by the defendant, it was
before plaintiffs' counsel successfully contacted defendant at the
West Jordan address. It is inexcusable for plaintiffs' counsel to
even refer to that address in his attempts to serve the defendant.
With little effort, plaintiffs' counsel could have ascertained
that the address of 6270 South 2005 West ("Airport Motel") is the
same as 6270 Margray. There is obviously no motel there. By the
attachment of the envelope from the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel
concedes the fact that he contacted defendant using the 6270
Margray address, further confirming the fact that he was negligent,
if not fraudulent, in suggesting to the Court anything about the
defendant's address being 1760 West 2100 South.

[Note that the

order authorizing publication of summons, prepared by plaintiffs'

-4-

counsel, states specifically that the last known address for the
defendant is 1760 West 2100 South.]
CONCLUSION
Nowhere in Plaintiffs' Memorandum is there any showing that
defendant received actual notice of the pendency of this action,
despite the fact that plaintiffs' attorney knew that defendant
lived at 6270 Margray in West Jordan.
timely
support

filed.
an

Defendant's motion was

Plaintiffs' Memorandum reflects no facts that

argument

that

any prejudice will

result

to the

plaintiffs by granting the motion. Defendant should be entitled to
present his case to the Court.

In view of the inconsistencies in

the actions and representations of plaintiffs' counsel, relief from
the default judgment is appropriate in this case.

Defendant's

motion should be granted.

I

DATED this 1£ day of September, 1994.
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
By
Jy/Siott Lun
Attorneys for De

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

12- day of September, 1994, I caused a

copy of the foregoing Reply to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
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George K. Fadel 11027
Attorney for Flaintiffu
170 Meet 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
295-2421
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AMD FOR DAVIS COUNT*,
STATE OF UTAH
GLEN V. WARDLE and
THORA WARDLE,
riaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING
ftEftoRANDtm orrosxtro
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING tlTLB III MAlNTirr

v9.
Civil No. 940700002
LESTER ROMERO,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Defendant.

Attached hereto is the affidavit of the Sheriff"of Salt Lake
County as to attemped service of summons upon the defendant.
Dated this 15th day of September, 1994.

FADEL
Attorney for Plaintiffs
I mailed a copy hereof to Mr. J. Scott Lundberg, attorney
for defendant, P.O. Box 1290, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 this
15th day of September, 1994.

STATE OF UTAH
ss. SHERIFF'S OFFICE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I, Deputy Jack Hill, being first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:
That I am a citizen of the United States over the age of twenty-one years at the time
of service herein, and not a party to this action.
That I received the hereto annexed summons, complaint on the 5th day of January,
1994. Between the dates of January 13, 1994 and March 11, 1994, I attempted service of
said paper a total of 23 times (dates listed below).
That the address I attempted service is 6270 S. Margray Dr.
Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this 8th day of September, 1994.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of September, 1994.

Docket ft 941658
By 7 / OMJAjX
Salt Lake City, Utah
Notary I\iblic residing in S;
My commission expires: 1/20/95
1/13/94
1/14/94
1/18/94
1/19/94
1/25/94
1/26/94
1/27/94
1/28/94

1/31/94
2/2/94
2/3/94
2/9/94
2/10/94
2/14/94
2/15/94
2/16/94

2/23/94
2/27/94
2/28/94
3/2/94
3/3/94
3/10/94
3/11/94

MDTARYPUBUC
MARILYN ROBINSON
437 South 200 East
Salt Lata City, UT8<111
My Ccrruntesicn Expires
Jaguar* 20 £95
SUfEGPtnAH

ADDENDUM 3: RULING AND ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA
WARDLE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE QUIETING TITLE IN
PLAINTIFFS

LESTER ROMERO,
Defendant.

Case No. 940700002

Comes now the Court and having reviewed the memoranda filed by Plaintiffs and
Defendant on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgement and Decree Quieting Title in
Plaintiffs, the other documents on file with the Court, and being fully advised in the premises,
the Court hereby enters the following findings and ruling:
1.

The Court hereby finds that the instant case was commenced on January 3,

2.

That on or about January 3, 1994, Plaintiffs supplied an original Summons and

1994.

a copy of said Summons and Complaint with the Civil Process Division of the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Office.
3.

That the address indicated for Defendant was "6270 So. Margray Dr., West

Jordan."
4.

That at the time of the events in question, Defendant in fact resided at the 6270

So. Margray Dr., West Jordan.
5.

That Deputy Hill received Plaintiffs' Summons and Complaint on January 5,

1994, and unsuccessfully attempted to serve said summons and complaint on Defendant
twenty-three (23) times between the dates of January 13, 1994 and March l l f 1994.

Additionally, the Court further finds that Deputy Hill attempted the foregoing service at 6270
S. Margray Dr.
6.

That by attempting to serve Defendant twenty-three (23) times at his correct

address, i.e., 6270 S. Margray Dr., Plaintiffs in good faith exercised reasonable diligence in
attempting to search for or ascertain the whereabouts of Defendant. See Downey State Bank
v. Maior-Blackenev Corp.. 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); see also Carlson v. Boss, 740 P.2d
1269, 1276-1278. (Utah 1987).
7.

That the property that is the subject of the underlying action is located in Davis

County.
8.

That Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Service of Process by Publication and Order,

dated April 12, 1994, which the Court granted authorizing service of process upon Defendant
by publication and by mail at Defendant's last known address.
9.

That Plaintiffs' Summons wasfirstpublished in the Davis County Clipper on

April 15, 1994, and was published in each issue of said newspaper for three (3) weeks, the
last publication being in the issue dated May 6, 1994.
10.

That Plaintiffs either through mistake or inadvertence represented to the Court

that Defendant's last known address was 1760 West 2100 South.
11.

That the 1760 West 2100 South address is the general delivery address for the

United States Post Office.
12.

That service by mail was subsequently unsuccessfully attempted twice at the

1760 West 2100 South address.
13.

That, notwithstanding said mistake, based on Deputy Hill's attempt to serve

said summons and complaint on Defendant twenty-three (23) times between the dates of

January 13, 1994 and March 11, 1994, and the fact that Plaintiffs' Summons was published in
the Davis County Clipper on April 15, 1994, and was published in each issue of said
newspaper for three (3) weeks, the last publication being in the issue dated May 6, 1994,
service of process under all the circumstances was reasonably calculated to apprise Defendant
of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonable or practicable as required under Rules
4(e) and 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14.

Indeed, the Court finds that, in total, service was attempted over a period of

approximately three (3) months, i.e., January 13, 1994 to March 13, 1994, (personal), and
April 15, 1994 to May 6, 1994, (publication). Thus,
15.

Finally, the Court finds pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure that Defendant failed to respond to Plaintiffs1 Summons and Complaint within the
statutorily prescribed twenty (20) day period.
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgement and Decree
Quieting Title in Plaintiffs. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare an order consistent
with this ruling and submit the same to opposing counsel prior to the time it is submitted to
the Court for signature.
Dated this 2$*^ day of December, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed to the
following parties this 2 3

day of December, 1994:

George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
J. Scott Lundberg
LUNDBERG & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290

.jJLJ 9.
Michael D. Di Reda
>>
Law Clerk to the Honorable Rodney S. Page

JHHI2

10 au &H '95

Jun

George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiffs
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84 010
295-2421
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BY
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
GLEN D. WARDLE and
THORA WARDLE,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 940700002 QT
LESTER ROMERO,
Judge Rodney S. Page
Defendant.

The Court rendered a Judgment and Decree Quieting Titled in
Plaintiffs to property situated at 320 East Center Street, North
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah, on June

15, 1994, upon

application of the plaintiffs for entry of default of the defendant
and for judgment by default.

Defendant filed a motion to set aside

the judgment and decree dated September 6, 1994, asserting lack of
personal service.
parties
Motion

and
to

the

The court has reviewed the memoranda of both
file and has issued its Ruling

Set. Aside

Judgment

and

Decree

on

Quieting

Defendant's
Title

for

Plaintiffs wherein the Court has made its findings of fact and
conclusions of law that service of process in this in rem action
was proper, the plaintiffs having exercised reasonable diligence
to serve the defendant personally.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment and

Decree Quieting Titled in Plaintiffs be, and the same is hereby
denied.
2.

That the Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs

dated June

15, 1994, entered June 16, 1994, is in no manner

affected by the defendant's motion to set aside the same.
DATED this

» ^ day of January, 1995.

BY THE COURT
District
Judge
District cJudqe
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
^ I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the proposed order
denying the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment herein to
Mr. J. Scott Lundberg, attorney for defendant, P.O. Box 1290, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84110 this 7 ^ day of December, 1994.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review an order of
the Utah Industrial Commission pursuant to §35-1-86 Utah Code Ann.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND OF AGENCY
This is a Petition

For Review

of

an Order of

the

Utah

Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented for review on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether or not the Industrial Commission erred
by ignoring competent, reliable and credible
evidence
of
the
industrial
cause
of
Applicant's
accident
and
by
finding
no
industrial accident occurred.

The standard of review is the "substantial evidence" standard.
(See Willardson vs. Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah
App.

1993); King vs. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285

(Utah App. 1993)).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-86 states as follows:

"The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review,
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any
order."
STATEMENT OF CASE
On February 3, 1994, Petitioner filed an Industrial Disease
and Accident Claim with the Industrial Commission.
was

claiming

that

her

on-the-job
2

activities,

The Petitioner
which

included

standing to watch a moving conveyor belt for approximately 11 hours
caused her to faint and sustain a concussion and head injury.
Defendants claim that Petitioner's recent bout with bronchitis
and inner ear infection caused her to faint and hit her head on the
floor and thus, denied her claim.
The medical records indicate that Petitioner had been awake
for approximately 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident.
The Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Colver reported that the
Petitioner's fainting was probably due to a generalized weakness
and working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of
bronchitis.

Dr. Colver goes on to indicate that the Petitioner's

fainting may also have had some labyrinthitis with some vertigo
which could have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor
belt.
On or about October 12, 1994, the Administrative Law Judge
found that Petitioner's industrial accident was not a result of her
work activities.

However, in so doing, he ignored competent,

credible evidence that Petitioner's work activities and conditions
aggravated her internal infirmities, causing an accident.

On or

about February 17, 1995, the Industrial Commission affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's decision, failing to give adequate
weight to a clarifying letter from Dr. Colver dated March 21, 1994,
wherein, he

stated

that

Petitioner's
3

physical

condition

was

aggravated by working too hard and being on her feet which could
have been exacerbated by the motion of the conveyor belt. However,
the Industrial Commission referred to his opinion as "conjecture".
The

Industrial

Commission

also

failed

to

give adequate

consideration to the Petitioner's emergency room physician, Dr.
Egbert, who's report indicates that considering the nature of the
Petitioner's work he believed that the most likely the cause of her
passing out was motion sickness due to the watching of the conveyor
belt going past her.

However, the Industrial Commission referred

to his opinion as "conjecture".
The

Industrial

Commission

also

failed

to

give adequate

consideration to the Summary of Medical Records submitted by Dr.
Clark.

Dr. Clark specifically states that there is a medically

demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial accident
and the problems for which Petitioner was treated.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
At the time of the accident, the Applicant was 75 years old
and had been working for Stouffer Foods for only 3 days. The shift
that she had been working, and was working at the time of the
accident, began at 3:00 p.m. and was to end at 11:00 p.m.

At the

time of Applicant's injury she had been getting less sleep than
normal because her sleep pattern had been disturbed by the new job.
She had recently suffered a cough without fever, chills, sweats and
4

a sore throat, from which she was recovering.
accident,

Applicant

had

completed

her

At the time of the

shift

and

was

working

overtime.
The

Applicant's

duties

consisted

of

standing

next

to

a

conveyor belt which transported frozen food and watching the boxes
as they came down the conveyor belt.

If any of the boxes needed to

be

so.

readjusted,

Applicant

would

do

On

the

night

of

the

industrial accident, Applicant had a meal break from 7:30 p.m. to
8:30 p.m. in the cafeteria.

Through-out her 8 hour shift and the

overtime, the Applicant had been standing.

Sometime shortly after

12:13 a.m., during the overtime shift, the Applicant looked up at
the ceiling lights and then at the boxes as they moved along the
conveyor belt and began to feel light headed.
that

she did not

Applicant testified

feel ill or faint. From that point

Applicant had no recollection of what happened.

on, the

Sometime soon

thereafter, Applicant fell backwards hitting her head on the tile
floor.

The Applicant was placed in a stretcher and transported to

Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah, where she was hospitalized
for 3 days.

Prior to working at Stouffer Foods, the Applicant had

been out of the work force for a considerable period of time.

On

the day of the accident, the Applicant had been up since 6:00 a.m.
that morning.

The doctor's notes indicated that the Applicant had

been awake for 20 hours at the time of the industrial accident.
5

In the hearing, Victoria Nelson, a Registered Nurse, employed
by Stouffer Foods for 7 years, testified that she knew of other
employees on another conveyor line who had become nauseous or light
headed.

Ms. Nelson testified that on the other conveyor line the

movement of the belt would make people light headed.

She stated

that many of the people who became light headed had been pregnant.
Ms. Nelson also testified that to her knowledge, no one had fainted
or had light headiness problems on the conveyor line in which the
Applicant had been working.
Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found the
Applicant had an abnormal EEC

However, it is not clear from the

medical records whether the abnormal EEG occurred as a result of
the fall or was present prior to the fall.
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "On December 7,
1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected that the fall was due
to a syncope based upon a generalized weakness due to resolving
bronchitis and possibly due to mild labyrinthitis exacerbated by
working on her feet at a moving conveyor belt all day."
3 of Order)

(See Page

The Industrial Commission also stated that Dr.

Colver's opinion of the cause of the fall was conjecture (See
Addendum E page 3).

However, what Dr. Colver stated was:

Syncope.
This is probably due to a
generalized weakness and working too hard on
her feet after getting over a bout of
bronchitis.
She may have also had some
6

labyrinthitis with some vertigo which could
have been exacerbated by the motion of the
conveyor belt. (Emphasis added) (See Addendum
A).
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to mention, and the
Industrial Commission ignored a letter from Dr. Colver, dated March
21, 1994, which was submitted by the Applicant.

Said letter

stated:
In response to your questions in the letter
dated March 12, 1994, you asked if my report
states that you had a inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter
from Mr. Keith F. Walquist, dated March 8,
1994, states: "also he reported that you had a
inflammation of the inner ear which could
cause vertigo".
Mr. Walquist is misquoting me. My note dated
7-7-93, says that she may have also had some
labyrinthitis with some vertigo. Thus, I did
not say that you had an inflammation of the
inner ear, I merely hypothesized that it was
possible.
There is no way of knowing from my reports or
examination if you had a inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident.
I did feel the most likely cause of your
fainting was, "due to a generalized weakness
and working too hard on your feet after
getting over a bout of bronchitis".
My
records indicate that you had a cough from
which you were recovering when you went back
to work and had the accident...(Emphasis
added).
(See Addendum B)
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
also failed to give adequate consideration to a letter of December
7

14, 1993, from the Applicant's emergency room physician, Dr. L.
Dean Egbert.

Dr. Egbert states the following:

Mrs. Brunson is a 74 year old women that I saw
in the emergency department on 12-7-93, after
falling while working at a conveyor belt while
working at Stouffers. She had been working
there for only 2 days, she did not feel any
spinning sensation, simply became light
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor
sustaining a contusion of her brain. She was
admitted to the hospital. As far as I know,
no other specific cause of the blacking-out
episode was found. Considering the nature of
this work I think that the most likely cause
of her passing out was motion sickness due to
watching the conveyor belt go passed (sic)
her. (Emphasis added)
(See Addendum C)
The Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission
also failed to give proper weight to the Summary of Medical Record
which

was

signed

neurosurgeon.

In

by

Dr.

said

John

R.

Clark,

Summary

of

Medical

the

Applicant's

Records,

it

is

specifically stated that there is a medically demonstrative causal
relationship between the industrial accident and the problems for
which she was treated.

(See Addendum D)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Commission ignored and disregarded competent, reliable and
credible evidence from the petitioner's treating physicians when it
found that the petitioner's industrial injury was caused by a preexisting condition rather than as a result of her fainting while
watching the conveyor belt.
8

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IGNORED COMPETENT, RELIABLE
AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
WHICH MEETS THE STANDARD OF REASONABLE MEDICAL PROBABILITY AS TO AN
INDUSTRIAL CAUSE OF THE APPLICANT'S ACCIDENT.
The Court of Appeals has authority to reverse the Industrial
Commission's Order.

(See U.C.A. §35-1-86).

The standard applied

by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the Industrial Commission's
Order is "substantial evidence".

(See Willardson vs. Industrial

Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993); King vs. Industrial
Commission, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993)).

"Substantial

evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

(See Willardson vs.

Industrial Commission, 856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993).
The Industrial Commission adopted the Administrative Law
Judge's Findings of Fact (See Addendum F page 1).

Thus, this

appeal includes issues covered in the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order.
The Industrial Commission arbitrarily disregarded competent
evidence when it affirmed the Administrative Law Judge and found
that the applicant had failed to establish medical causation.

In

Nicholson vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 389 P.2d 730 (Utah
1964), the Supreme Court recognized the fact that it would not
9

disturb the findings or the order of the Commission if they were
supported by "substantial evidence".

However, at the same time

they recognized that the Supreme Court has a duty, particularly
with reference to the denial of compensation, to determine whether
the Commission has arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence in
making its decision.
In the Administrative Law Judge's Findings, the last paragraph
on page three, it states:
A preponderance of evidence shows that Mrs.
Brunson's injury coincidentally occurred at
work because of her idiopathic condition
without any enhancement from the work place.
Although, there has been speculation about why
she had the fainting episode there is no
evidence which can be set-forth which meets
the
standard
of
a
reasonable
medical
probability. (See Addendum E)
"Medical

causation

demands that

petitioner

*prove

(his)

disability is medically the result of a exertion or injury that
occurred during a work-related activity.'"
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986).

Allen vs. Industrial
""The key question in

determining causation is whether given this body and this exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury.'" Stouffer Foods
Corp. vs. Industrial Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah App. 1990)
(quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 24).

In order to answer this question,

we must focus on what exertions by Petitioner are involved.

See

id.; Nyrehn vs. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah App.
10

1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Colver stated on
two occasions, that although, petitioner's physical condition was
weaker than usual, it was aggravated by, "...working too hard on
her feet..." and "...could have been exacerbated by the motion of
the conveyor belt".

In his clarifying letter of March 21, 1994,

Dr. Colver goes on to state in more definitive terms, "I do feel
the most likely cause of your fainting was, 'due to a generalized
weakness and working too hard on your feet after getting over a
bout a bronchitis'".

(emphasis added).

As also pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein, the
December 14, 1993, letter of L. Dean Egbert, M.D., the emergency
room physician, stated, also in definitive terms, his opinion of
the cause of the Applicant's injury.

He stated:

Considering the nature of this work, I think
the mostly likely cause of her passing out was
motion sickness due to watching the conveyor
belt go passed her. (emphasis added).
The Administrative Law Judge states in his Findings that there
was no evidence that had been set-forth which meets the standard of
a reasonable medical probability.

The definition of medical

probability, according to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, Fourth Edition,

page 318, is as follows:

Possibility*
Probability:
These are terms that
refer to the likelihood or chance that an
injury or illness was caused or aggravated by
11

a particular factor. "Possibility" sometimes
is used to imply a likelihood of less than
50%; "probability" sometimes is used to imply
likelihood of greater than 50%. (See Addendum
G).
The opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert both state, "the
most likely cause" of the Applicant's injury was due to working too
hard, being on her feet for extended period of time, and motion
sickness from watching the conveyor belt. The words, "most likely
cause" certainly indicate that, in their medical opinion, there is
more than a 50% likelihood that the of the cause of the accident
was the Applicant being on her feet for an extended period of time,
working too hard, and motion sickness from watching the conveyor
belt. Thus, both treating physicians opined that it was medically
probable that the cause of the accident was industrially related.
Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge ignored opinions of
reasonable medical probability from the two treating physicians
that the injury was in fact caused by conditions of the Applicant's
employment.

Dr. Clark's opinion that petitioner's injury was

directly related to an industrial accident compounds further the
evidence in favor of petitioner.
It is well established that if a pre-existing condition is
aggravated by working conditions, resulting in an injury, as long
as the activity which caused the injury was extraordinary in
nature, causation is established and workers compensation benefits
12

should be ordered.

(See Allen vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d

15 (Utah 1986)). Certainly, standing on one's feet for nine or more
hours watching a conveyor belt would be considered an extraordinary
activity. An ordinary 20th century person would not usually engage
in a similar exertion in everyday, nonindustrial life.

(See Allen

vs. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986)).

As is set-

forth herein, the Applicant did not suffer from an idiopathic fall.
The Applicant was recovering from some pre-existing conditions, and
consequently, may have been in a weakened state.

However, as

stated by the opinions of Dr. Colver and Dr. Egbert, it is more
than likely that the cause of the accident was the aggravation of
those pre-existing conditions by the long hours the Applicant was
working, standing on her feet the entire time and the motion
sickness that she incurred by watching the conveyor belt. This is
also supported by the testimony of Victoria Nelson, the Registered
Nurse

employed

by

Stouffer

Foods, who

testified

that

other

employees at Stouffer Foods had become nauseous and light headed by
watching the conveyor belt.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner requests that this Court find that the Commission,
in denying petitioner's application for benefits, arbitrarily
disregarded competent evidence in when it determined that the
petitioner's job-related-activities did not cause the industrial
13

accident.

There simply is no evidence to indicate otherwise.

Thus, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court enter an
Order reversing the Industrial Commission's Order in this matter.
DATED this J ^ day of July, 1995.

^rv<^-.

FREI
WAYNE A.. FREESTONE
Attorney for Applicant
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Ctn
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL
1000 East# U.S. Highway 6
Payson, Utah 84651

A

INTERNAL MEDICINE CONSULTATION REPORT
Name:
Hosp• #:
Date:

Brunson, Reba
01 36 75
12-7-93

Consulting Physician:
Referring Physician:

Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
John R. Clark, M.D.

CHIEF COMPLAINT:
This is a 75-year-old white female patient admitted by Dr. Clark
because of syncope and cerebral contusion.
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS:
The patient recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or
sore throat from which she was recovering. She returned to her new
job working at a conveyer belt at Stouffer's yesterday evening and
after standing for almost her complete 8 hour shift she felt dizzy
and then fell backwards with apparent loss of consciousness and
struck the back 'of her head. She sustained a laceration and a
cerebral contusion.
Apparently she had no chest pain,
palpitations, or shortness of breath. It is unclear whether her
dizziness was vertigo or light headedness.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:
1.

Partial thyroidectomy in 1973, now on chronic Synthroid
therapy.

2.

Appendectomy in 1967.'

3.

Spinal meningitis without sequelae in 1958.

\?*<*S ^y 4.
'

,*(*•'

Brief syncopal episode many years ago while in a shower after
getting over a cold.
J/j

MEDICATIONS:

Synthroid, one pink pill per day.

ALLERGIES:

None known.

HABITS:

None.

SOCIAL HISTORY:
The patient is married and has a new job at Stouffer's.

EXHIBIT

Brunson, Reba
Consultation Report
Page 2 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
REVIEW OF SYSTEMS:
Otherwise negative except for significant hearing loss.
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
General:

This is a sleepy white female with a left hearing aid.

HEENT:

Head:
Eyes:
Ears:
Throat:

Lungs:

She has a laceration on the back of her head.
The pupils are equal and round and respond to
light.
The tympanic membranes were difficult to
visualize due to narrow canals.
Clear.

Clear.

Cardiac: Normal SI and S2, 2/6 systolic murmur at the upper left
sternal border.
Abdomen: Bowel sounds present,
tender.
Extremities:
Neural:

Without cyanosis, clubbing or edema.

Mental status is alert and oriented. Cranial nerves II
through XII show decreased hearing, otherwise intact.
Motor strength is 4 to 5/5 in all extremities. Sensory:
She has light touch sensation in all extremities. Deep
tendon reflexes: There is a +2 left prepatellar and a
trace right prepatellar reflex. Babinski's are absent.

Laboratory:

EKG shows possible left anterior fascicular block,
otherwise normal. Chemistries include a glucose of
137, LDH 200. CBC: WBC 6.2, hematocrit 39.4. CBC
unremarkable.

IMPRESSION AND PLAN:

r3

aytfilsil
*t '

tic

The abdomen is soft and non-

<$
i<rvy&M-*

Syncope. This is probably due to a generalized weakness and
working too hard on her feet after getting over a bout of
She may have also had some labyrinthitis with
i
f U v / r v bronchitis.
some vertigo which could have been exacerbated by the motion -Kr /,.,/
" < - " fcof the conveyer belt. There has been no arrhythmias<rahd no •»''»'''
indication of other cause of syncope. The preliminary report
jC^on the carotid ultrasound shows very trace left plaque and
hone on the right. I would like to check some cardiac enzymes
and also check the urinalysis. If these are negative, I do

Brunson, Reba
Consultation Report
Page 3 - Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
not feel strongly that any further for the workup for the
cause of syncope is indicated.
I do agree with the EEG as
already ordered by Dr. Clark.
2.

History of thyroidectomy.
QD.

Will resume her S>nthroid 0.2 mg

KEVIN J. COLVER, M.D.
Verified By Electronic Signature
KJC/cm
D/ 12-7-93
T/ 12-7-93

13:41
15:36
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J'Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
1120 East Highway 6, Suite 1
Payson, Utah 84651

March 21, 1994

Reva Brunson
91 South 200 East #4
Provo, Utah 84606
Dear Mrs, Brunson:
In response to your questions in the letter dated 12 March 1994,
you asked if my report states that you had inflammation of the
inner ear prior to the accident. The letter from Mr. Keith F.
Wahlquist dated 8 March 1994 states, "also he reported that you
had an inflammation of the inner ear which could cause vertigo."
Mr. Wahlquist is misquoting me. My note dated 7-7-93 says that,
"she may have also have some labyrinthitis with some vertigo."
Thus I did not say that you had an inflammation of the inner ear,
I merely hypothesized that this was possible.
There is no way of knowing from my reports or examination if you
did have inflammation of the inner ear prior to the accident.
I did feel the most likely cause of your fainting was, "due to a
generalized weakness and working too hard on her feet after
getting over a bout of bronchitis." My records indicate that you
had a cough from which you were recovering when you went back to
work and had the accident. The sentence in Mr. Wahlquists letter
which states, "Dr. Kevin Colver reported that your fainting was
probably due to your getting over a bout with bronchitis" is
accurate.
Sincerely,

Kevin J. Colver, M.D.
KJC/pj
EXHIBIT "B"
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MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL
1000 East, U.S. Highway 6
Payson, Utah 84651

(/

'N

December 14, 1993

L'JJ- h<*

/

To Whom It May Concern:
Re:

Reva Brunson

Attending Physicians:

John R. Clark, M.D.
Kevin J. Colver, M.D.

Mrs. Brunson is a 74-year-old woman that I saw in the Emergency
Department on 12-7-93 after falling while working at a conveyer
belt at Stouffer's. She had been working there for only two days.
She did not feel »* any spinning sensation, simply became light
headed, passed out, hit her head on the floor sustaining a
contusion to her brain. She was admitted to the hospital. As far
as I know, no other specific cause of the blacking out episode was
found. Considering the nature of this work, I think that the most
likely cause of her passing out was motion sickness due to watching
the conveyer belt go past her.
Sincerely,
L. Dean Egbert, M.D.
Emergency Room Physician
Mountain View Hospital
LDE/cm
D/ 12-14-93
T/ 12-14-93

9:37
10:45

EXHIBIT

lf
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x\tsvisea 7/93
Industrial Commission of Utah-Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
ft
(801)530-6800
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD
(to be completed by treating physician)
l\^i/Vi~ J>rn^v^£rW

EVALUATION FOR:
DATE OF INJURY:

~~? \\0^-

f?*/^

EMPLOYER,

1. Has applicant been released for usual work? AJO What date?_
2. Has applicant been released for light duty? J/o What date?_
3. Applicant was required to be off work from *7 O^a. fJ to

^exe**"*

4. Has applicant a permanent injury? r*°
5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach
a final state of recovery?
6. If there is a permanaent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terras
of percentage of loss of function:
-—
7. Is there a medicallly demons tractive casna.1 relationship between the
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? Y*S Please
explain as necessary:
b a^"i~- C^C^ c^c^/s/<rv% oU^^y^djf^
8. What
required as a result of the
wnat future
tuture medical
medical treatment
treatment will
will be
be require
industrial accident?
&£ser*rarr)')f^
oh C<s
9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to
previously existing conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease
of congenital causes?
/*
10.What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from
all causes and conditions, including industrial injury?
11 Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existsing
condition? Please explain as necessary:
AC^/h
Dated this'ti

day of Apn/

Physician's, Name (please print)

^7*L^

fU*-/£-*>

Physician
Lcian's Signature

Parser* Or SV6S7
City/St^ete/Zip

^

19 4Y
Physician'S"*5peci/alty

tn?~ M>yA^
Street Address

6 **'-z*~

Qoi /ytr-yste
Physician's Telephone Number

"
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 94-180
REVA BRUNSON,
Applicant,
vs,
STOUFFER FOODS CORP. and/or
TRAVELERS INSURANCE,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 3CO South, Salt Lake City, Utah on August
31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
The hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES j

The applicant, Reva Brunson,
represented herself pro se.

was

present

and

The defendant employer, Stouffer Foods, and its
insurer, Travelers Insurance, were represented by
Steven Aerchbacher, Attorney at Law.
The applicant, Reva Brunson, claims medical expenses and
temporary total disabilitv. The applicant was initially scheduled
for a hearing on July 15, 1994. She has a profound hearing loss
and wears hearing aids.
Because her hearing aids were in for
repair, she was unable to ^ear the proceedings, and elected, after
considerable discussion, to delay the hearing until August 31,
1994.
On August 31, 1994, arrangements were made by Travelers
Insurance to have a stenographic reporter present who provided a
lap top computer by which the applicant could see on a computer
screen all of the discussion that transpired in the hearing room.
In addition, as back-up, the Industrial Commission provided a 20
inch computer screen by which typed questions could be shown to the
applicant.
The 20 inch screen was not necessary since the
applicant could adequate^, read on the lap top computer screen what
was transpiring during the session.
The defendants submitted an additional document on September
27, 1994, and the applicant submitted her response to it on
September 30, 1994. The rase was considered ready for an Order on
October 3, 1994.

REVA BRUNSON
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER
PAGE TWO
This case involves a fall at work. The 75 year old applicant,
who looks younger than her age, had been working for Stouffer Foods
(Stouffer) for only three days at the time of her injury. During
her work for Stouffer, her shift was from 3:00 o'clock p.m. to
11:00 p.m. She was getting less sleep than she normally got, and
although she had rested prior to going to work, her sleep pattern
had been disturbed. MR at 16. At the time of her injury, she
recently had a cough without fevers, chills, sweats, or sore throat
from which she was recovering. She was working overtime. Her job
was to stand next to a conveyer which transported frozen food and
to readjust boxes as they came down the conveyer belt. On the
night of the industrial incident, she had a meal break from 7:30 to
8:00 p.m. in the cafeteria.
At about 12:13 a.m., the applicant recited that she felt fine.
She had been standing during her shift, and during her overtime.
She looked up at the ceiling lights, and then at the boxes as they
moved along the conveyor belt. Sometime thereafter she stated that
she began to feel "light headed". ' She did not feel ill, nor did
she feel faint. She has no recollection of what happened, but she
fell backwards, hitting her head on the tile floor. She was placed
on a stretcher and transported to the Payson Hospital where she was
hospitalized for three days.
The applicant had previously worked as a supervising
seamstress. She had also worked for Carlisle Foods. After a long
period being out of the work force, she went to work for Stouffer.
Stouffer instructed all of its employees, including the applicant,
that if they were injured they were to go to see a company nurse,
and if they were feeling ill they were to tell a supervisor or
trainer.
On the day of this incident, the applicant had been up since
6:00 a.m. that morning.
The doctor's notes indicate that the
applicant had been awake for' 20 hours at the time of the industrial
incident. Although the applicant denied that she had been up for
20 hours, from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight is 20 hours. The applicant
recited that she rested before she went to work. She claims that
her problem stemmed from a lack of carbohydrates and attributes her
fainting to lack of foods high in carbohydrates in Stouffer's
cafeteria, and the movement of the conveyor on which she adjusted
the food boxes.
The defendant employer provides free food to its employees,
but does not tell them what to eat. The employees may choose such
food items as they desire. Offered are entree items, salads,
cereals, snacks, breads, peanut butter, and normal food items
carried by cafeterias including numerous other carbohydrates. The
employer is not responsible for providing its employees food.

REVA BRUNSON
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER
ORDER
The applicant was adamant at the hearing in expressing her
physical endurance and ability to work for extended periods of
time. In fact, subsequent to her injury, the applicant recited
that she had worked from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. in May 1994 for several
days moving heavy boxes from a storage area.
The applicant also asserted that her problem with fainting and
falling while at work at Stouffer was due to the fact that she had
an extra undershirt on, and that the additional clothing caused her
to get too warm.
Victoria Nelson, a registered nurse employed by Stouffer Foods
for seven years, testified that she has had other people on another
conveyor line who have become nauseous or light headed. On the
other conveyor line, the movement of the belt will make people
light headed. Many of the people who become light headed have been
pregnant. No one has had fainting or light headedness problems on
the conveyor line on which the applicant was working to the
knowledge of Ms. Nelson.
The applicant's conveyor line was
designed differently.
The applicant suffers from previously existing long standing
Hypacusis, and Hypothyroidism which is under control by replacement
medication. Subsequent to the fall, Dr. David T. Roberts found an
abnormal EEC
He reported that some of the forms appear
"suspiciously epileptiform in character." MR at 49 & 8. It is not
clear from the medical records whether this abnormal EEG occurred
as a result of the fall, or was present prior to the fall.
On December 7, 1993, Dr. Colver reported that he suspected
that the fall was due to a syncope based upon a generalized
weakness due to resolving "bronchitis and possibly due to mild
labyrinthitis exacerbated by working on her feet at a moving
conveyor belt all day." MR at 53.
Dr. Clark gave her work releases through March 17, 1994. At
the time he released her to return to work on March 17, 1994, he
indicated that she had a post-concussion syndrome which was
subsiding, as well a slight left ulnar neuropathy. She told Dr.
Clark that she was afraid to return to work because she works swing
shift, and at this time of the evening she is most tired and does
not feel well. She claimed that if she could return to work during
the day shift that she could handle it because during the day she
is able to lift items and do her house work. MR at 19.
The preponderance of the evidence shows that Mrs. Brunson's
injury coincidentally occurred at work because of her idiopathic
condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Although
there has been speculation about why she had the fainting episode,
there is no evidence which has been set forth which meets the

REVA BRUNSON
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER
PAGE FOUR
standard of a reasonable medical probability.
Prior to and at the time of her syncopal episode and fall,
Mrs. Brunson was not engaged in any activity which created any
strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of her normal
nonemployment life or the normal nonemployment life of any other
person. Her syncopal episode and injury did not result from any
strain, exertion, or stress related to her employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. Mrs. Brunson was not injured by accident arising out of
and in the course of her employment with her employer.
2.
Neither Mrs. Brunson's employment nor any activities
related thereto were the legal cause or medical cause of her
injury.
3.

The fall was related to a'syncopal episode.

4. Mrs. Brunson is not entitled to workers7 compensation
benefits as set forth in U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-1 et seq.
DISCUSSION:
The general rule concerning causation is that an employee
cannot recover for a physiological malfunction which is not
job-induced and which could have happened as easily away from work
as at work. Thus, in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d
722, 723-24 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court denied recovery for
a herniated disc caused by preexisting back problems from another
job, and which manifested itself when the employee engaged in
lifting activities which were not strenuous and could have happened
anywhere. Accord Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango. 674 P.2d 104
(Utah 1983); Farmers Grain Co-op. v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Ind. Comm'n
and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) ; see also Nuzum v. Roosendahl
Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977); Redman
Warehousing Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283
(Utah 1969) .
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a different rule applies,
however, where because of some non-occupational internal weakness
(such as a fainting spell), an employee falls and sustains an
injury from the fall. Kennecott v. Ind. Comm'n and Georgas. 675
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983). The Court stated, however, that the Georgas
case did not present the question, and for that reason the Court
did not decide whether an idiopathic fall to level ground and
resulting injuries were compensable. Id. at FN 4. Compare. e.g..
Williams v. Ind. Comm'n, 38 111.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 744 (1967)

REVA BRUNSON
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ORDER
PAGE FIVE
(recovery for fall to level floor denied), with Lovett v. Gore
Newspapers Co. , Fla., 419 So.2d 306 (1982) (recovery allowed). The
instant case presents the instance of a fall to a level tile floor.
It will be helpful to first review the statute germane to this
case. The Utah statute in effect at the time of the injury states
in pertinent part:
Each employee ... who is injured ... by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment,
wherever such injury occurred,... shall be paid
compensation ....
U.C.A. Sect. 35-1-45 (1988).
The statute requires an accident "arising out of and in the
course of" employment. Id. (emphasis added). It is not sufficient
to have an injury which occurred ir> the course of employment, but
which did not arise out of the employment. There is no question,
but that the head injury occurred in the course of her employment.
However, the question based upon the facts of this case, is whether
the arising out of prong has been met.
The arising out of
requirement might be met out of the hardness of the tile floor as
an added employment hazard.
A. Larson, Law of Workmen's
Compensation. Sect. 12.14(e)(1994). As Professor Larson discusses,
a china dish might survive if dropped on the kitchen linoleum, but
would not have a chance on the ceramic tile floor of a factory.
Of the five cases allowing a level-floor award, one involved
a tile floor (General Ins. Corp. V. Wichersham, 235 S.W.2d 215
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951), three involved a concrete floor (Smith v.
Container Gen. Corp., 559 So.2d 1019 (Miss. 1990); Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ace. Comm'n, 41 Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4
(1953); George v. Great Eastern Food Prod.. 44 N.J. 44, 207 A.2d
161 (1965), and one involved a "hard wood" floor (Pollock v.
Studebaker Corp.. 97 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. App. 1951).
These cases
indicate that the arising out of prong is satisfied by a physical
impact with a floor which was the immediate cause of the injury.
However, the great majority of cases deny recovery where the
injury occurred upon a tile or concrete floor because these types
of floors are common outside the work environment, and these types
of floors present risks which are not unique to work. See e.g.,
Oldham v. Ind. Comm'n. 139 111. App. 3d 594, 93 111. Dec. 868, 487
N.E. 693 (1985)(the diagnosis was a transient loss of consciousness
of unknown etiology, and the necessity of standing and the presence
of a clay tile floor were not risks greater than those outside of
the employment).
In the instant case, there is insufficient evidence to show
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that the injury arose out of the employment. There was no showing
that the applicant's employment posed a risk to her that was
greater than that to which she would be exposed as a member of the
general public. There are many homes and businesses which have
concrete and ceramic tile floors, and had she fainted in any of
them, her injury would have been as severe.
Under the
circumstances, as much as I would like to give her an award, there
is unfortunately no legal basis for recovery since the medical
evidence does not show by a preponderance that her fainting was
caused by her employment.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim filed by Reva Brunson for
injuries filed as a result of a fall on December 7, 1993 while
working on the premises of Stouffer Foods Corporation must be
dismissed with prejudice since it did not arise out of her
employment for Stouffer Foods Corporation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have 15 days from the date of
filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response
with the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12(2).
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DATED THIS / <^C day of October 1994,

ijamim A. Sims
(/
'"Administrative Law Judge
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
REVA BRUNSON,

*
*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*

STOUFFER FOODS CORPORATION and
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

*
*
*

Defendants.

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case No. 94-0180

*
*

Reva Brunson asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the
Administrative Law Judge's decision denying her claim for benefits
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over this
Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set
decision of the ALJ, summarized below.

forth in the

Ms. Brunson had worked at Stouffer Foods for only three days prior
to the accident in question. The accident occurred on December 7, 19 93
while she was assigned to adjust packages of frozen food that passed by
on a conveyor belt. Without warning, she fainted and struck her head
on a tile floor.
As a result of the fall, Ms. Brunson suffered a
concussion and required overnight hospitalization.
Ms. Brunson can only speculate as to the cause of her fainting
spell. She has submitted a written statement from Dr. Colver that "the
most likely" cause of the incident was "a generalized weakness and
working too hard on your feet after getting over a bout of bronchitis."
She has also submitted a written statement of Dr. Egbert that "the most
likely" cause of her accident was "motion sickness due to watching the
conveyor belt go passed (sic) her." Finally, Dr. Clark states "there
is a medically demonstrative causal relationship between the industrial
accident and the problems for which (Ms. Brunson) was treated."
However, Dr. Clark provides no explanation of his conclusion.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the ALJ concluded that Ms.
Brunson had failed to establish that her fainting and resulting injury
"arose out of and in the course of" her employment at Stouffer Foods.
The ALJ therefore held that her injury was not compensable under the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the course
of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45.) It is the worker's
burden to prove that his or her employment is both the medical and the
legal cause of injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15
(Utah 1986). The focus of this case is on the requirement of medical
causation, which requires Ms. Brunson to prove that her work at
Stouffer Foods was the medical cause of her injury.
Ms. Brunson herself cannot explain why she fainted at work.
Likewise, her physicians' statements do not reveal any reasonable
medical certainty regarding the cause of her fainting. In fact, Dr.
Colver and Dr. Egbert arrive at two different conjectures to explain
the incident. Under these circumstances, the Commission agrees with
the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. Brunson has failed to establish medical
causation.
As noted above, it is Ms. Brunson's burden to prove medical
causation. Because she has not done so, the Commission must deny her
claim for workers' compensation benefits.
ORDER
The Commission affirms the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge and dismisses Ms. Brunson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this / /

IMPORTANT!

day of February, 1995.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 days
of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this
Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review with
that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this Order.
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
REVIEW in the matter of Reva Brunson, Case No. 94-0180, was mailed,
first class, postage prepaid this / 7 day of February, 1995, to the
following:
WAYNE A. FREESTONE
PARKER, FREESTONE, ANGERHOFER & HARDING, P.C.
BANK ONE TOWER
50 WEST 3 00 SOUTH, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
STEVE J. AESCHBACHER
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
70 SOUTH MAIN STREET
P O BOX 45385
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0385
REVA BRUNSON
91 SOUTH 200 EAST #4
PROVO, UTAH 84606

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
Orders\94-0180
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Steven Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

^UACA.

Kj^AAAy^^

20

.

ADDENDUM G

22

Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment

5. Illness, Disease: An illness may be considered to be
the summation of the physical, mental, and other
kinds of factors that are involved in an individual's
less than optimal health status. A disease may be
considered to be the specific pathophysiologic
processes involved, which give rise to the individual's
signs and symptoms and their progression. 1
6. Employability: This is the capacity of an individual
to meet the demands of a j o b and the conditions of
employment associated with that j o b as defined by an
employer, with or without accommodation.
7. Employability Determination: This is an assessment
by management of the individual's capacity, with or
without accommodation, to meet the demands of a
j o b and the conditions of employment. The management carries out an assessment of performance capability to estimate the likelihood of performance failure
and the likelihood of incurring liability in case of
human failure. If either likelihood is too great, then
the employer may not consider the individual employable in the job.
8. Medical Determination Related to Employability: This
is the process of evaluating the relationship of an
individual's health to the demands of a specific j o b
as described by the employer, such as demands for
performance, reliability, integrity, endurance, or
prolonged service. The physician must ensure that
the medical evaluation is complete and detailed
enough to draw valid conclusions with respect to the
individual's capability of meeting the job's demands
and carrying out essential j o b functions.
The physician's tasks are to (1) identify
impairments that could affect performance and determine whether or not the impairments are permanent; and (2) identify impairments that could lead
to sudden or gradual incapacitation, further impairment, injury, transmission of a communicable disease, or other adverse occurrence.
In estimating the risk factors, the physician should
indicate whether or not the individual represents a
greater risk to the employer than someone without
the same medical condition and should indicate the
limits of the physician's ability to predict the likelihood of an untoward occurrence.
9. Risk, Hazard: A risk represents the probability of an
adverse event; a risk must be weighed together with
the consequences of the adverse event. An individual's activities or characteristics, and biologic, physical,
or chemical factors, may increase the risk of morbidity or mortality.
A hazard is a potential source of danger; to a
woman contemplating crossing the Atlantic Ocean
in a rowboat, the Atlantic presents a serious hazard.
Excessive numbers of coliform bacteria or Shigella

dysentenaem the public water supply present a hazard
to a city.
10. Possibility, Probability: These are terms that refer
to the likelihood or chance that an injury or illness
was caused or aggravated by a particular factor.
"Possibility" sometimes is used to imply a likelihood
of less than 50%; "probability" sometimes is used
to imply a likelihood of greater than 50%.

Social Security Disability D e t e r m i n a t i o n s
Although the Social Security system predated the
first Guides edition and is not based on the Guides, a
description of the system is included here to compare
and contrast the ways in which medical information
is used u n d e r each approach.The Social Security
Administration (SSA) has national responsibility
u n d e r Public Law 74-271 for the administration of
both the Social Security disability insurance program
(title II) and the supplemental security income (SSI)
program (title XVI). Every person who pays into
Social Security contributes to the Social Security
Disability Trust Fund.
T h e title II program provides cash benefits to
disabled workers and their dependents who have
contributed to the trust fund through the FICA tax
on their earnings. A person qualifies under the title
II program because of financial need. T h e title XVI
program provides for a minimum income for the
needy, aged, blind, and disabled. Under that program, financial need is indicated by limitation of
income and resources to a level that is equal to or less
than an amount specified in the law.

Definitions and Terms
Under the title II and title XVI programs, the definitions of disability are essentially the same. The law
defines disability as "the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months (Section 223 [d] [1] [A]).
The law may apply to infants and children as well as
adults. In terms of the law, a person is either disabled
or not disabled.
To meet the definition of disability, an individual's impairment or combination of impairments must
be of such severity that he or she not only is unable
to do the work previously done, but also cannot perform any other kind of substantial gainful work considering the individual's age, education, and work
experience (Section 223 [d] [2] [A]). Substantial
gainful work means any work that involves significant
and productive physical or mental activities and is
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